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I.

INTRODUCTION

During this decade there has been a significant cutback in federal
housing subsidy programs.' In the same period, rising mortgage interest rates, land costs, and rapid population growth in states such
as Florida have driven the cost of housing for low and moderate income
households upwards. As a result, housing advocates and local governments have searched for new approaches to reduce the housing affordability problem. Observing the boom in downtown office construction
in cities throughout the country, these officials developed office linkage
or exaction programs. These programs require office developers, as
a condition of approval for their projects, to either construct low and
moderate income housing units or contribute to a city trust fund to
be used for such purposes.2 Cities have developed various formulas

*Assistant Professor, Department of Legal and Real Estate Studies, School of Business and
Management, Temple University. B.S., 1979, Ph.D., 1985, University of South Carolina.
**Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate, College of Business
Administration, University of Florida. B.A., Denison University, (1974); M.C.P., University of
Pennsylvania, (1976); Ph.D., The Ohio State University (1984).
1. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOMEBUILDERS, LOW AND MODERATE INCOME
HOUSING: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 35-47 (1986) (historical perspective on
federal housing programs).
2. See Porter, The Linkage Issue: Introductionand Summary of Discussion, in DOWNTOWN
LINKAGES 2-22 (Porter, ed., 1985); Keating, Linking Downtown Development to Broader Community Goals, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A. 133-41 (1986) for background on linkage programs.
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dictating the time and amount of contribution required. In 1981, San
Francisco became the first city to develop a linkage program; since
then a number of other cities including Boston, Santa Monica, and
Miami have adopted similar programs. A number of other cities have
considered or are currently considering using housing exactions.3
This commentary takes a brief look at some of the major issues
confronting the use of linkage fees. The first section addresses the
legal issue of whether there is a "rational nexus" between commercial
development and a reduction in the supply of affordable housing. The
next section discusses two related topics: (1) what market factors made
linkage programs in some areas of the country successful; and (2)
whether linkage programs are viable in depressed office markets. This
section also outlines the market effects of linkage fees. Developers
may respond to linkage fees in a number of ways that adversely affect
the amount of commercial development and, consequently, the success
of the linkage fee program. Finally, the alternatives to linkage fee
exactions are considered.
II.

THE RATIONAL NEXUS TEST

Fundamental to the adoption of linkage programs has been the
legal justification for such an approach. Current debate centers on
issues such as what constitutes a "rational nexus" and whether it
exists in a particular jurisdiction, 4 whether linkage constitutes a taking
for which compensation might be demanded, 5 and the authority of
local governments to impose such programs. 6 The nexus question is
particularly important because linkage programs are impermissible
without some connection between the regulation and the lack of affordable housing. Thus, the nexus requirement addresses whether a link
actually exists between office development and housing affordability.
One argument supporting a nexus is that office development has both
direct and indirect effects on housing affordability. Direct effects arise
from the demolition of housing units to clear space for office development. Indirect effects are the result of the increase in demand arising
from the new workers brought to the city by the office building and
the increase in land values resulting from the more intense office type
usage.
3. See Porter, supra note 2, at 10-11 for a listing of cities adopting or considering adopting
impact fees. See also Waldman, Cities are Pressuredto Make Developers Share Their Wealth,
Wall St. J., March 10, 1987, at 1.
4. See Quinn, Inclusionary Zoning and Linkage: Land Use Planning Techniques in an
Age of Scarce Public Resources 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (1987).
5. Id. at 33-37.
6.

Id. at 30-33.
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Governmental requirements that new housing units replace those
demolished in clearing a development site have ample precedent in
such programs as urban renewal and highway construction. Exactions
imposed on developers to mitigate off-site impacts to infrastructure
such as roads and sewer and water systems are also common in many
states. 7 However, relating office development to off-site housing needs
and establishing a nexus is more controversial. For instance, San
Francisco has made a careful attempt to trace the relationship between
office space and off-site housing needs.8 The City's line of reasoning
suggests that the net addition of office space leads to a net addition
of employees, a portion of whom will reside in San Francisco. A subset
of these employees will be new households that demand housing units.
Some of these new households will be unable to afford a housing unit
in the city without subsidy assistance. The provision of housing has
traditionally been left to the private market. Certain groups that are
unable to find adequate housing, however, have relied on governmental
subsidy programs to fill the gap. In a similar manner, linkage programs
are designed to assist these households find affordable housing units.
Linking development of new non-residential space to residential
units implies a responsibility on the part of employers to house their
employees. Linkage also ignores the benefits office space already generates by increasing income and expanding the tax base of the city.
Casual observation in many cities indicates that a substantial underutilized or vacant housing stock exists in close proximity to downtown.
The presence of this housing stock implies that a housing shortage
does not exist and that the units are not high valued. Thus, outside
of intensely developed cities such as San Francisco and Boston, the
nexus argument is problematic.
III.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LINKAGE

Lost in the debate over the legal issues are the economic implications of linkage programs. Even if a rational nexus can be established
and the other legal questions addressed, under what conditions would
a city want to establish a linkage program? If linkage fees have been
successfully implemented in San Francisco, does this imply that such
a program can be implemented in any city or are certain market
conditions necessary for the successful implementation of linkage pro-

7. See Delaney, Impact Fees, Housing Costs, & Housing Affordability, 1 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 87 (1987).
8. See RECHT HAUSRATH & ASSOCIATES, SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR AN
OFFICE-HOUSING PRODUCTION PROGRAM (July 1984) (discussing the methodology).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I

grams? In other words, what are the office market effects of linkage
fees likely to be in different cities? This paper will address the potential
effects on the office market that economic theory suggests would result
from the imposition of linkage fees. Some of this analysis parallels
that done in housing markets. But it recognizes that office markets
differ in some respects such as the scale of operations, length of construction periods, and the predominately rental tenancy.
A.

Are Linkage Fees Attractive Today?

The economic history of commercial and residential development
indicates the impetus behind the development of linkage fees. First,
the advent of linkage programs seems to roughly parallel the passage
of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. 9 This tax law more than
halved the previous depreciation period for non-residential property
such that these properties could now be depreciated over fifteen
years. 10 Also during this period, lending institutions had substantial
resources they eagerly lent for commercial development projects. This
combination of tax advantages and available financing led to the construction of office buildings that may not have been justifiable by
purely economic/market criteria. The result is an oversupply of office
space in may cities, with an excess capacity that may take five to ten
years to absorb in some cities., However, during the early 1980's the
federal government made substantial cutbacks in its funding of housing
subsidies. Housing advocates and local governmental officials observed
the growing construction of new office buildings and felt that such
buildings were contributing to neighborhood housing problems. Thus
linkage programs were developed to tap the office developers to support low and moderate income housing.
In 1986, federal tax legislation again substantially changed the real
estate investment market. The Tax Reform Act instituted a number
of major provisions that reduced the financial incentives for constructing new office space.12 For example, the Act lengthened the depreciation period for office buildings to 31.5 years, allowed only straight
9. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 furthered the incentive towards capital formation
by generally allowing shorter depreciation recovery periods under a new accelerated cost recovery system. See generally HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (1981)
(concise explanations of the Act's provisions).
10. I.R.C. § 168(b) (1985). In addition to straight line depreciation, 175% declining balance
was available to investors. Id.
11. Dowell, Plannersand Office Overbuilding, 52 J. AM. PLAN A. 131-32 (1986).
12. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMirEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (1987) (legislative background and general explanation
of the Act).
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line depreciation, 8 eliminated lower capital gains tax rates, 14 and
placed limitations on the ability to use negative taxable income from
real estate investments. 5 Coupled with lower tax brackets and an
oversupply of office space which had resulted in the previous five year
period, these tax law changes will probably result in little new downtown office space.' 6 Thus, under current market conditions, linkage
fees appear unlikely to generate many new housing units for low and
middle income groups. Even under better market conditions, however,
linkage programs have a number of potential pitfalls that limit their
effectiveness in solving housing affordability problems. The following
section discusses the market effects of linkage fees that determine
their practicality under various types of market conditions.
B.

Market Effects of Linkage Fees

This section demonstrates that the viability of such programs will
depend upon the characteristics of the office markets in which the
fees are levied. Linkage fees are borne by any of three parties: (1)
the developers in the form of reduced profits; (2) the tenants through
higher rental rates; and (3) landowners who receive lower prices for
land suitable for office development. Office market conditions will dictate the incidence of the fees. However, the net result of imposing
impact fees may be a reduction in office construction as no party is
willing or able to absorb the fee. The following sections discuss the
potential effects of linkage fees on office markets. "7 Alternatives are
then discussed for markets in which linkage fees are likely to have
adverse effects.
C.

The Developer's Perspective

The effects of linkage fees on developers' behavior are critical in
assessing the fees' usefulness. Developers of new office space are motivated by the expected profit generated by the development. These
profits are derived from two sources: (1) the annual after-tax cash

13. I.R.C. § 167(c) (1987).
14. See id. at §§ 1201-88 (1987) (capital gains and losses).
15. Id. at § 172(b) (1987) (net operating loss carrybacks and carryovers).
16. Salomon Brothers, Inc., reports that after peaking at a $29 billion annual rate in early
1986, office construction has fallen to $21 billion a year and is expected to fall to $15 billion per
year. Cells, Real Estate, Wall St. J., July 15, 1987, at 31. This construction is both city and
suburban office space. One report states that more than one-half of new office space is being
built in suburban locations. Fulton, Office in the Dell, PLANNING 13-17 (July 1986).
17. A more detailed discussion is Huffman & Smith, Market Effects of Office Linkage Fees,
54 J. Am. PLAN. A. (forthcoming 1988).
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flows from rentals, and (2) the after-tax proceeds received upon sale
of the building.'S A developer's rate of return is a function of these
cash flows and the equity he has invested.19 The rate of return required
by the developer is primarily a function of the riskiness of the real
estate investment as perceived by the developer relative to other
possible investment opportunities. 20
Assuming the developer bears the entire burden of a linkage fee, 21
the fee reduces the cash flows to the developer and consequently
lowers the rate of return received. Developers will not accept this
decrease unless the loss is very minor or the developer still receives
returns high enough to continue to entice development. The magnitude
of the decrease in the rate of return will be a function of the amount
and nature of the exaction, the size of the investment, the equity
contributed, and the length of the investment holding period.
Substantial variation in these parameters over time and across
markets and developers make specific or "normal" rates of returns
difficult to determine with precision. However, assuming that markets
are competitive so that most developers just earn their required rates
of return, any decrease in that return would drive development from
the market. Developers are more likely to suspend development in an
area if other development opportunities are available elsewhere. Because real estate market inefficiencies prohibit cities from fine tuning
the impacts of linkage on development, the net result is to discourage
development in the area.An additional effect of linkage fees is they increase the riskiness
of the project to the developer. The developer incurs additional risk
because in most linkage schemes he must pay the fees up front or in
the early years of the project. Relatively slow lease up periods and
18. See generally H. SMITH & J. CORGEL, REAL ESTATE: PERSPECTIVES ch. 17 (1987)
(valuation theory and financial analysis).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 601-616.
21. In other words, the developer does not pass the linkage fee on to another party, such
as tenants or land owners. See Delaney, Impact Fees, Housing Costs, & Housing Affordability,
1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 87, 92-99 (1987) (general overview of effects of impact fee).
Delaney provides a survey of studies that indicate the burden of impact fees depends upon
which parties, the developer, home buyer, or landowner, have the least sensitivity to price
changes. Id.
22. This result assumes the developer bears the burden of the linkage fee. Even when the
developer only bears a portion of the linkage fee, and the rest is passed on to tenants, the
quantity of office space demanded decreases as rental prices increase. See Delaney, Impact
Fees, Housing Costs, & Housing Affordability, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 93-94 (1987).
Also, the fee may further discourage development by communicating to developers the local
government's negative attitude.
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the making of rental lease concessions to attract tenants may combine
with the fees to result in negative cash flows and increased probability
of default. These factors increase risks and require a corresponding
increase in rates of return to compensate developers for accepting
such risks.
If the developer cannot pay the fee himself yet still has a viable
project, then linkage fee must be passed either to the office space
user/tenant or recouped in the form of lower land prices paid to landowners. In the latter case, the developer must be able to anticipate
and account for the imposition of the fee by lowering the price he is
willing to pay for the land. Because of the long lead time necessary
for office development, many potential office sites are already owned
by the developer so the linkage fees cannot be passed to the landowner.
Further, landowners will accept a lower price only if current or alternative uses of their land are expected to be below the land's value as
office space. In these situations, they may hold out for their expected
market price rather than sell for a lower price.2 Assuming some market competitiveness, some sites would not be available for office use
at a lower price. If neither landowners nor developers bear these
costs, then tenants will bear the financial burden. However, the next
section demonstrates that in many markets tenants may not have to
accept rent increases because of their flexibility in choosing space and
the availability of space elsewhere.
D. Market Requirements
The supply of office space developers provide is directly related
to the characteristics of the demand for this space. First, strong preference by potential tenants for downtown locations are necessary to
pass linkage fees to office space users. However, it has been established that recent transportation and telecommunication advances have
led service industries, and office space in particular, to become increasingly footloose.- This mobility increases potential tenant's locational
alternatives. Consequently, potential tenants are more sensitive to
rental rate increases. This sensitivity is heightened by the current

23. See A. MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES
90-91 (1984).
24. The footloose nature of many office tenants is discussed in Archer, The Determinants
of Location for General Office Firms Within Medium Sized Cities, 9 J. AM. R. ESTATE &
URB. ECON. A. 283-97 (1981); E. Mills, Service Sector Suburbanization (1987) (unpublished
manuscript).
25. In particular, potential renters may be more willing to locate in suburban office buildings
rather than in downtown areas. E. Mills, supra note 24.
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oversupply of office space in many urban markets. 26 Thus, in addition
to being footloose, many tenants have additional choices available in
the urban areas. This combination makes it unlikely that the developers could force these tenants into accepting rental increases. Only the
combined interaction of price insensitivity resulting from tenant immobility, strong attraction to downtown locations, and relatively tight
markets (an undersupply of office space relative to demand) can make
exaction fees workable. These characteristics probably exist in San
Francisco and a few other cities, but are not widespread.
E.

Potential Market Effects

If developers cannot pass through linkage fees, rates of return will
decrease and drive developers from the market. If the attempt to
pass through fees resulted in the loss of some office type employees,
total demand for office space would be less. Assuming an increase in
demand for office space, the reduction in new supply leads to higher
rents. Higher prices would offset the higher costs of development so
that eventually the supply of office space might increase in response
to the increase in prices and profits. But these higher rents are the
result of changing market forces over time, and only indirectly attributable to linkage fees. Further, the resultant total supply would
probably remain lower than in the absence of linkage fees.
IV.

LINKAGE FEE ALTERNATIVES

Linkage fees have a potentially adverse impact on real estate markets. Either developers, office space users, or landowners will ultimately bear the burden of these fees. Thus, the supply and/or demand
for office space declines making linkage fees less attractive and revenue
generation less predictable. Assuming linkage fees create potential
market problems, but assuming the rational nexus between office space
and housing exists, then what alternatives exist?
One alternative is to revise linkage fees to lessen their possible
market effects. Voluntary fees, rather than mandatory fees, might be
instituted as was done in Miami. These types of programs provide
incentives for participating developers such as density bonuses. The
program allows the developer to choose whether to build additional
affordable housing or to participate in linkage in return for density
bonuses or other incentives. However, these types of incentives call

26. COLDWELL BANKER, OFFICE VACANCY INDEX OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
27. Even in the situation the developer bears the fee and the associated risk until the space
is leased if the fee is levied up front.
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into question the integrity of local zoning ordinances. For example, if
density can be increased under a linkage program why does the current
zoning code only permit a lower density?
A second alternative is to not require the developer to pay linkage
fees until leasing reaches some threshold level. This method reduces
the severity of having high initial fee payments. While the city would
have to wait longer to receive the linkage funds or housing units, risk
would be reduced for the developer. The reduced risk would lead to
greater investment in office space development and greater contributions to affordable housing projects.
In situations where the fee can be passed through to tenants, it
is likely that owners of existing office space will also raise rents to a
level comparable with rents in new buildings. In this manner, owners
of existing office space accrue windfall profits. These existing buildings
also attract employees and contribute to the problem linkage fees seek
to alleviate; however, because they were built prior to linkage fee
programs, they avoid having to pay a fee. A transfer tax or other
similar method29 that spreads the incidence of linkage fees to all buildings would lessen the likelihood of these types of adverse market
effects.
Even a tax on all downtown buildings does not completely address
the housing problem. Because of the increased mobility of potential
renters, the housing problem has become a regional, rather than a
purely local, problem. Thus, a regional transfer tax or other revenueraising method, levied by a county or multi-county taxing authority,3°
is a broad-based approach to meeting this problem. The more broadbased the approach, the more difficult it becomes for developers, office
space users, and landowners to escape the tax. Thus, the regional tax
lessens the likelihood of the adverse market effects increased mobility
causes.
Finally, local policy-makers need to consider the benefits of downtown office development before instituting linkage policies. These
buildings provide a wide range of jobs from construction to clerical to

28. Currently, payment of linkage fees over a development's first five years is also common.
29. A transfer tax is levied against the sales price of a building when the building is sold.
For example, Dade County, Florida, has doubled its surtax on transfers of all real property
except single family homes, condominiums, and cooperatives. See Appel, Facing the Urban
Housing Crisis, REAL EST. FIN. J., Winter, 1987, at 40. Other income sources might include
a tax on the recording of mortgages, a local capital gains tax on real estate sales, interest on
real estate escrow accounts, or taxes on commercial leases.
30. The authority would be charged with providing low and moderate income housing within
the entire county or multi-county jurisdiction.
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professional. Each of these job categories are needed in many cities.
In addition, individuals in these jobs each pay taxes to the city. So,
while improving low and moderate housing opportunities is a laudable
goal, linkage fees may not be the best way to address the problem in
many cities.
V.

CONCLUSION

Linkage fees appear to be an attractive means to generate funds
for low and moderate income housing. They also appear to be legally
viable provided they meet the rational nexus test. In many cities,
however, local market conditions are not conducive to such fees.
Rather than increasing funds or construction for low-income housing,
linkage fees may simply reduce local office construction. Local policymakers should consider the potential adverse effects in a given market
and investigate alternatives to linkage fees.

